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1 Introduction
Pharmaceutical markets are characterised by price inelastic demand mainly due to extensive
medical insurance. Since individuals — once they are ill — only pay a small fraction of the
medical cost, prices are likely to have a limited eﬀect, not only on the choice of whether
or not to consume a drug, but also on the choice between alternative drug treatments. On
the supply-side, there are large, sunk R&D costs associated with the discovery of new drug
treatments. To stimulate innovation, pharmaceutical firms are granted market power (for a
given period) by patent protection.
The combination of supply-side market power and price inelastic demand has induced
purchasers to employ various means to control medical expenditures.1 We can distinguish
between two price control mechanisms: (i) regulation of drug prices (price caps); and (ii) reg-
ulation of the reimbursement level, frequently referred to as reference pricing (RP). While
price caps limit the pharmaceutical firms’ ability to exploit market power by charging high
prices, RP aims at stimulating competition by making demand more price elastic. In this
paper, we analyse in detail the eﬀects of RP on the price-setting strategies of the pharma-
ceutical firms. On the basis of this analysis, we discuss implications for market entry of new
drug treatments, patient health risks, and optimal drug reimbursement policies. While these
issues have received some empirical attention, theoretical contributions are very limited.2
RP of prescription drugs is quite novel, but has rapidly become a widely used price control
mechanism in the pharmaceutical market. Germany’s Statutory Health Insurance System,
generally viewed as the pioneer in this regard, introduced RP for prescription drugs in 1989,
which was followed in Europe by the Netherlands in 1991, Denmark and Sweden in 1993,
Spain in 2000, and Belgium and Italy in 2001. Norway adopted RP in 1993, but abandoned
it in 2001, because the expected cost savings did not materialise. Outside Europe, RP has
been adopted by Australia, the Canadian province of British Columbia, and New Zealand.3
The reference price is constructed as follows: drugs are classified into clusters based on
1Danzon (1997) provides an excellent overview and discussion of various regulatory mechanisms in the
pharmaceutical industry.
2According to the extensive literature survey by Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2001), the bulk of the
RP literature is mainly descriptive, and there is a pronounced lack of theoretical studies analysing the eﬀects
of RP systems. See also Danzon (2001).
3 In the US, RP has been proposed as a possible approach to drug reimbursement for a comprehensive
Medicare drug benefit (Huskamp et al., 2000). Kanavos and Reinhardt (2003) argue that RP for drugs is
compatible with US health care. Notably, generic reference pricing is well-established in the US through
"maximum allowable charge" programs used by, e.g., Medicaid.
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similar therapeutic eﬀects. The regulator sets a reference price based on a relatively low-
priced drug (e.g., the minimum or median price) in the cluster. The reference price is the
maximum reimbursement for all products in the group. Pharmaceutical firms can set prices
above the RP, but in this case the patient must pay the surcharge.4
The construction of therapeutic clusters for RP is by far the most controversial task in
the development of such systems. These clusters may be narrowly or broadly defined: (i)
products with the same active chemical ingredients, (ii) products with chemically related
active ingredients that are pharmacologically equivalent, and (iii) products that may be nei-
ther chemically identical nor pharmacologically equivalent, but have comparable therapeutic
eﬀects. By its nature, the first type of cluster includes only oﬀ-patent brand-name drugs and
their generic substitutes. The second and third may include on-patent drugs. They diﬀer
in breadth, but are qualitatively similar. As is commonly done, we refer to the first type as
generic reference pricing (GRP), and the second and third as therapeutic reference pricing
(TRP).
We construct a theoretical model that allows us to analyse the eﬀects of the two RP
systems, as well as the benchmark case of no reference pricing (NRP), where patients pay a
fixed share (co-payment rate) of the drug price.5 The basic set-up is a therapeutic market
with potentially three pharmaceutical firms, where two of the firms oﬀer original brand-name
drugs with diﬀerent chemical ingredients. One of the brand-name drugs is an old treatment
(e.g., the breakthrough drug) that has lost its patent protection and faces competition from
a third firm oﬀering a generic version, perceived to be of lower quality than the oﬀ-patent
brand-name drug.6 The other brand-name drug is a new, horizontally diﬀerentiated treat-
ment under patent protection that will be introduced in the market, if the profits are suﬃcient
to cover the entry costs.7 This modelling approach enables us to discuss the arguments for
4On the other hand, if a firm’s price is below the RP, the savings may be shared between the payer and
the dispensing pharmacist.
5The NRP regime is often referred to as ‘free pricing’, but we find this somewhat imprecise, since RP
in itself does not restrict price-setting of drugs by pharmaceutical firms. Only the reimbursement level is
regulated, not drug prices.
6Empirical evidence strongly suggests that generic drugs are not perceived to be perfect substitutes to
the original brand-name drug, despite being chemically identical. After generic entry, the original brand-
name firm typically charges a higher price than its generic version and still has positive market shares (e.g.,
Grabowski and Vernon, 1992, Frank and Salkever, 1997, Scott Morton, 2000). These findings fit well with
predictions of vertical diﬀerentiation models. Two recent papers applied to branded-generic competition are
Cabrales (2003) and Königbauer (2005).
7One can think of the entry costs as a marketing cost associated with entering a new country-specific
market. Alternatively, the entry costs can be thought of as (expected) R&D costs, which must be recouped
for the discovery of a new drug treatment to take place.
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and against RP systems in general, and between TRP and GRP in particular.
The main argument in favour of RP is, that it stimulates price competition by making
demand more elastic and thus results in lower medical expenditures. Intuitively, the eﬀect on
price competition should be stronger, the wider the cluster is defined. Our model confirms
this line of argument. We show that the price of every drug in the therapeutic market is
highest under NRP and lowest under TRP. It is worth noting that GRP not only reduces
the prices of the drugs in the reference cluster, but also puts a downward pressure on the
price of the non-included, but therapeutically equivalent drug. This is due to prices being
strategic complements.8
The inclusion of on-patent drugs is perhaps the main source of controversy over RP-
systems. It is argued that TRP per se eﬀectively eliminates patent protection and will stifle
innovation in drug therapy, while GRP, on the other hand, is considered to have a minimal
eﬀect on incentives for R&D since it applies only to oﬀ-patent drugs (see e.g., Danzon,
2001, and Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy, 2000). Our model confirms the first line of
the argument, but not the second. We show that TRP provides the lowest profits to the
patent-holding firm, making market entry (and innovation) of the new drug treatment least
likely.9 However, we also find that a patent-holding firm can be negatively aﬀected by RP,
even if on-patent drugs are exempted from this particular reimbursement system. Stronger
price competition induced by GRP forces the patent-holding firm to lower the price of its
drug in order to reduce the loss of market shares.
Another important concern about TRP is that this system forces a large number of
patients to opt for a less suitable drug simply to avoid the extra co-payment. The broader
the therapeutic cluster, the more severe is the trade-oﬀ between surcharges and increased
health risks to patients.10 GRP, on the other hand, is said to conserve third party funds
8Pavcnik (2002) provides strong evidence from Germany that the introduction of RP has induced phar-
maceutical prices to drop, the eﬀect being stronger for branded drugs facing generic competition. Aronsson
et al. (2001) provide similar evidence from Sweden.
9This result has empirical support from Danzon and Ketcham (2004) who analyse the eﬀect of RP on the
availability of drugs in Germany, the Netherlands and New Zealand.
10Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000, p. 111) formulate this problem as follows:
"First, if there is no interchangeability at the level of the individual patient [...] then the co-
payment may become not avoidable and the RP system may discriminate against some patients.
Second, selection of a drug under a RP category may result in a lower level of eﬀectiveness and
potentially harmful side eﬀects for the patient because the drug is chosen simply with a view to
avoiding the copayment".
The same argument is presented by Danzon (2001).
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without exposing patients to significant risks, because it applies to substitution only among
generically equivalent drugs that have demonstrated bioequivalence to the original brand-
name drug. For given prices, this is, of course, trivially true. However, the intention of
the RP systems is to induce price responses from the pharmaceutical firms. Taking this
into account, we show that, in fact, GRP distorts drug choices most, exposing patients to
higher health risks. Since the on-patent drug is exempted from reference pricing under GRP,
the patent-holding firm faces a less price-elastic demand than its competitors and can thus
charge a considerably higher price. This induces a larger fraction of patients to choose the
drugs that are included in the reference cluster, which are less suitable, but have a lower
co-payment.
In terms of policy implications, our results suggest no clear-cut conclusions about the
optimal choice of reimbursement system. We can, however, make distinctions among the
following general cases. If market entry costs are low, with a corresponding low risk of no
market entry for new drugs, then TRP is clearly socially favourable. However, if this is not
the case, then either NRP or GRP might be necessary to stimulate market entry. The choice
between NRP and GRP implies a trade-oﬀ, since the former yields higher drug expenditures
but lower health risks to patients. A social planner’s evaluation of this particular trade-oﬀ is
determined by the importance of drug expenditures in the planner’s objective function. GRP
might thus be the favoured reimbursement system in countries where the pharmaceutical
industry is insignificant or non-existent, while NRP might be preferred otherwise.
The theoretical literature on RP is, as mentioned above, very limited with only a couple
of notable exceptions. Zweifel and Crivelli (1996) analyse the pricing responses to the intro-
duction of a RP system using a Bertrand duopoly model. They frame their analysis in the
context of the introduction of the TRP system in Germany in 1989. Danzon and Liu (1997)
use a monopolistic competition model with kinked demand and imperfect physician agency
to predict price responses to RP. The modelling approaches are distinctly diﬀerent from ours.
The combination of horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation allows us to analyse and compare
GRP and TRP closely. Moreover, our model also enables the analysis of market entry and
health risks to patients, which are lacking in the above mentioned studies.11
Our paper contributes also to the more general literature on horizontal and vertical prod-
11These important aspects of RP-systems are also absent in Merino-Castelló (2003), who studies the price
eﬀects of generic reference pricing in a vertical diﬀerentiation model.
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uct diﬀerentiation. Most papers within this field allow firms to invest in quality, but assume
consumers to diﬀer only along the horizontal dimension (taste).12 The present paper explic-
itly combines the horizontal diﬀerentiation framework of Hotelling (1929) with the vertical
diﬀerentiation framework introduced by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980) and Shaked and
Sutton (1982, 1983). While these two approaches typically are applied separately, the phar-
maceutical market — with both inter-brand (branded vs. branded) and intra-brand (branded
vs. generic) competition — serves as a natural example for combining these frameworks.
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2, the model is presented. In section 3, the
equilibrium prices are derived and characterised for all three regimes. Section 4 analyses the
market entry decision of the firm with the new drug treatment. Section 5 analyses the welfare
properties of the three diﬀerent regimes and presents some policy implications. Finally, in
section 6, the paper is concluded.
2 The Model
Consider a particular therapeutic market for prescription drugs with the following charac-
teristics. There are two patient types, indexed by j = H,L, diﬀering with respect to their
gross valuation of drug treatment, due to, e.g., diﬀerent degrees of illness. A fraction λ of
the patients are H-types, with a gross valuation v. The remaining patients — the L-types —
have a gross valuation γv, where γ ∈ (0, 1). Both patient types are uniformly distributed on
the line segment S = [0, 1], with a total mass of 1, where the location of an arbitrary patient,
x ∈ S, is associated with the patient’s susceptibility towards specific drug characteristics. A
‘mismatch cost’ parameter t measures the utility loss per unit of distance between a patent’s
ideal treatment — given by his location on S — and the drug actually consumed. We can think
of such mismatch costs as reflecting various side-eﬀects or contraindications that reduce the
gross valuation of drug treatment.
There are potentially three pharmaceutical single-product firms, indexed by i = 0, 1, G,
operating in the market. Firms 0 and 1 oﬀer original brand-name drugs at prices p0 and p1,
12Several papers have added quality competition to a standard Hotelling-framework, see e.g., Ma and
Burgess (1993) for the case of fixed locations under both price competition and price regulation, Economides
(1989) for the case of endogenous locations and price competition, and Brekke et al. (2006) for the case of
endogenous locations and price regulation. However, none of these papers allow consumers to diﬀer with
respect to their willingness-to-pay for quality, which means that the vertical diﬀerentiation framework is not
explicitly dealt with.
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respectively. These drugs, which diﬀer with respect to chemical compounds, are located at
either end of the unit interval S, reflecting their horizontally diﬀerentiated treatment eﬀects.
We assume that drug 1 is a new treatment version — still under patent protection — that will
be introduced in this particular market, if variable profits are suﬃcient to cover entry costs.
Drug 0, on the other hand, has already lost its patent protection and faces generic competition
from a third pharmaceutical firm G, oﬀering a generic drug version at a price pG. In terms
of horizontal diﬀerentiation, the generic drug is (naturally) also positioned at 0. However, in
the eyes of the patients, 0 and G are vertically diﬀerentiated. This is captured by assuming
that patients’ gross valuation of the generic drug is deflated by a factor θ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the
perceived quality diﬀerence between the two versions of drug treatment 0 is given by (1− θ).
This vertical diﬀerentiation might be due to diﬀerences in advertising intensity that creates
perceived quality diﬀerences, or simply due to the brand-name drug being perceived to be
safer, because of its longer life in the market.
Each patient needs one unit of either drug version. A patient of type j who is located at
x and consumes a unit of drug i obtains utility
Uj (x, i) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
uj − t |x− i|− ci if i = 0, 1
θuj − tx− ci if i = G
, (1)
where
uj =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
v if j = H
γv if j = L
, (2)
and ci is the patient co-payment for drug i.
Patients are (partially) insured and face a co-payment rate α ∈ (0, 1). In the absence of
a reference price system, the co-payment is simply given by ci = αpi. On the other hand,
in the presence of a reference price system, the co-payment is based on a reference price
p, and the patients must additionally pay the full price diﬀerence if choosing a drug in the
reference group which is priced in excess of the reference price. Thus, if drug i is included
in a reference price system, the co-payment is given by
ci =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
αpi if pi ≤ p
αp+ (pi − p) if pi > p
. (3)
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We analyse a three-stage game with the following sequence of events:
1. A benevolent regulator decides on the socially optimal drug reimbursement policy to
implement. She chooses among the following policies: (i) no reference pricing (NRP),
(ii) therapeutic reference pricing (TRP), or (iii) generic reference pricing (GRP).
2. Firm 1 decides whether to enter the market and thus to oﬀer a new treatment, given
that treatment 0 already exists and is oﬀered in the form of both an original version
(drug 0) and a generic substitute (drug G).
3. All pharmaceutical firms in the market play a simultaneous pricing game.
As usual, the game is solved by backward induction.
3 Drug pricing
In this section we derive the optimal pricing strategies of the pharmaceutical firms for each
of the three possible reimbursement regimes. We look for an equilibrium where all firms are
active and compete in terms of prices. This requires some restrictions on the parameters.
More specifically, we assume that the mismatch cost parameter t is bounded from both
below and above, i.e., t ∈
¡
t, t
¢
, where the lower and upper bounds are functions of the
other parameters. In the Appendix we show that, when t ∈
¡
t, t
¢
, there exists a vertically
separating equilibrium, where the brand-name drug 0 is priced ‘high’ and consumed by the
H-types only, while the generic substitute G is priced ‘low’ and consumed by the L-types
only.13 This is the only possible type of equilibrium, where the generic drug can survive in
the market, since all patients prefer drug 0 over drug G if c0 ≤ cG. On the other hand, the
horizontally diﬀerentiated brand-name drug 1 is consumed by both types in equilibrium.
It is worth noting that, in this context, it makes considerable intuitive sense to focus on
intermediate values of the mismatch cost parameter t. On the one hand, a very low t is not
compatible with patent protection, since a new drug must be suﬃciently diﬀerentiated to
obtain a patent. On the other hand, a very high t is not compatible with the notion of a
13To be more precise, we show that an equilibrium exists when t ∈

t, tk

, k = NRP , TRP , GRP . In
other words, there is a common lower bound on t in all three regimes, whereas the upper bound generally
diﬀers between the regimes.
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‘therapeutic market’. In particular, the idea of therapeutic reference pricing requires that
the drugs included in a reference group are not too diﬀerentiated.
Demand and profits
Let us first derive drug demand for each firm under the assumption of vertical market
segmentation. This requires the identification of two indiﬀerent patients; one for each of the
two patient types.
The H-types choose between the two brand-name drugs, and the location of the indiﬀer-
ent H-type patient, denoted exH , is given by the solution to
UH (exH , 0) = UH (exH , 1) ,
yielding
exH = 1
2
+
c1 − c0
2t
. (4)
The L-types, on the other hand, choose between the generic drug G and the horizontally
diﬀerentiated brand-name drug 1. The location of the indiﬀerent L-type patient, denoted
exL, is given by the solution to
UL (exL,G) = UL (exL, 1) ,
yielding
exL = 1
2
+
c1 − cG − γv (1− θ)
2t
. (5)
Under the additional assumption of full market coverage, so that all patients obtain non-
negative utility from the consumption of their most preferred drug, the demand facing firm
i is given by
Di =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
λexH if i = 0
λ (1− exH) + (1− λ) (1− exL) if i = 1
(1− λ) exL if i = G
. (6)
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Figure 1: Illustration of the demand system
Finally, assuming zero production costs, (variable) profits for firm i are simply given by14
πi = piDi. (7)
Figure 1 illustrates the demand system. Firm 0 providing the old breakthrough drug
serves only the high valuation (high severity) patients, represented by a fraction λ, whereas
the generic firm serves the low valuation (low severity) patients, given by the fraction 1− λ.
The new, on-patent drug, producer serves both segments.
3.1 No reference pricing (NRP)
In the absence of any reference price system, the patient co-payment for drug consumption
is simply given by
cNRPi = αp
NRP
i . (8)
Explicit expressions for the profit functions under the NRP-system are easily found by using
(8) in (4)-(7). In equilibrium, the two brand-name producers choose prices pNRP0 and p
NRP
1
that maximise π0 and π1, respectively, as defined by (7). The optimal strategy for the generic
producer, on the other hand, is to choose a price pNRPG that is just low enough to make it
unprofitable for firm 0 to deviate from pNRP0 by setting a ‘low’ price that also captures the
14At this stage, market entry costs (R&D costs and/or marketing costs) are sunk and thus play no role for
the analysis.
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L-types. The equilibrium drug prices are given by15
pNRP0 =
3t
α
∆0, (9)
pNRP1 =
t
α
∆1, (10)
pNRPG =
1
α
[3t∆G − γv (1− θ)] , (11)
where
∆0 :=
3− (1− λ)
√
1− λ
8 + λ
¡
λ2 + 3(1− λ)
¢ > 0, (12)
∆1 :=
10− λ
¡
λ2 + 3(1− λ)
¢
− 6 (1− λ)
√
1− λ
8 + λ
¡
λ2 + 3(1− λ)
¢ > 0, (13)
∆G :=
4− λ(2− λ)− (4− λ)
√
1− λ
8 + λ
¡
λ2 + 3(1− λ)
¢ > 0. (14)
We see that all prices are increasing in t and decreasing in α. Higher mismatch costs re-
duce the substitutability, and thus the degree of competition, between the brand-name drugs,
leading to higher prices. A higher co-payment rate, on the other hand, increases the price
elasticity of drug demand, leading to lower prices in equilibrium. It is also straightforward to
show that ∂∆i/∂λ > 0, implying ∂pi/∂λ > 0, for all i = 0, 1, G. A higher fraction of H-types
implies an increase in the overall willingness to pay, with a corresponding price increase for
the original drugs. This price increase also enables the generic producer to charge a higher
price in equilibrium.16 Note also that a reduction of the perceived quality diﬀerence between
the two versions of treatment 0 (i.e., an increase in θ) leads to a higher price for the generic
drug version, as expected.
On the other hand, a higher gross valuation of drug treatment for the L-types — i.e.,
an increase in γ — leads to a lower generic price in equilibrium. The reason is that a
higher gross valuation for the L-types, implying a higher willingness-to-pay for drugs, makes
it more profitable for firm 0 to lower its price in order to capture the L-segment of the
market. Consequently, the generic firm must reduce its price in order to prevent this price-
undercutting strategy from the brand-name firm. If the diﬀerence in gross valuations between
the two patient types becomes suﬃciently small — i.e., if γ becomes suﬃciently close to 1 — it
15A full derivation of the equilibrium is given in the Appendix.
16From (11) and (14) we see that λ must be suﬃciently high to secure a non-negative generic drug price
and thus equilibrium existence. See the Appendix for exact conditions.
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is not possible for the generic firm, with a (perceived) lower-quality product, to prevent the
brand-name firm from serving both patient types in equilibrium. In this case, the generic
drug is driven out of the market.
From (9)-(11) we can easily establish the following ranking of equilibrium drug prices:
pNRP0 > p
NRP
1 > p
NRP
G . (15)
These price diﬀerences are reflected in the allocation of equilibrium market shares:
exNRPH = 3 £3− (1− λ)√1− λ¤
2
£
8 + λ
¡
λ2 + 3(1− λ)
¢¤ ∈ µ3
8
,
1
2
¶
, (16)
exNRPL = 3 £2 + (2− λ)λ+ (2 + λ)√1− λ¤
2
£
8 + λ
¡
λ2 + 3(1− λ)
¢¤ ∈ µ1
2
, 0.77
¶
. (17)
The allocation of market shares allows us to assess if and how drug consumption is distorted
in equilibrium for the two patient types.17
Proposition 1 Under NRP, the brand-name drug with a generic substitute always charges
the highest price in equilibrium. Both patient groups are distorted: H-type patients consume
more of the new, patent-protected brand-name drug, while L-type patients consume more of
the generic drug.
It might seem counterintuitive that the price level is higher for the brand-name drug with
a generic substitute, since, normally, we would expect prices to be lower for products that
face stronger competition. The reason for this result is that, due to generic competition, the
optimal strategy of firm 0 is to concentrate exclusively on serving the H-type patients and
leave the L-types to the generic competitor. Since firm 0 competes only for H-patients with
less price-elastic demand, while firm 1 competes for both patient types, firm 0 sets a higher
price than firm 1 in equilibrium. This theoretical result tallies well with several empirical
findings of price increases for brand-name drugs after the entry of generic substitutes in the
market.18
17 ‘Distortion’ refers to allocations of consumption (or market shares) that diﬀer from the one that minimises
patients’ mismatch costs, i.e., hxj = 12 .
18The empirical study by Grabowski and Vernon (1992) shows that generic entry was followed by price
increases by the branded producer, a result later confirmed by Frank and Salkever (1997). This finding was
called the ‘generic competition paradox’ by Scherer (1993).
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Inserting the equilibrium prices into (7), we derive the equilibrium profits:
πNRP0 =
3tλ∆0
2α
(1 +∆1 − 3∆0) , (18)
πNRP1 =
t∆1
2α
(1 + 3 (∆G (1− λ) + λ∆0)−∆1) , (19)
πNRPG =
1− λ
2α
(1 +∆1 − 3∆G) (3t∆G − γv (1− θ)) . (20)
3.2 Reference pricing
Consider now the implementation of a reference pricing system. This implies that some drugs
are aggregated into a cluster and are subject to the same reference price p. The introduction
of a reference pricing system involves the following decision-making. First, the regulator
must decide which drugs to include in a cluster or reference group. In our model, this choice
boils down to whether or not the new brand-name drug should be included. Inclusion of
the horizontally diﬀerentiated new drug implies therapeutic reference pricing (TRP). On the
other hand, if the reference group consists only of the old brand-name drug and its generic
substitute, the reimbursement system is characterised as generic reference pricing (GRP).
Second, the regulator must decide on the reference price level. In most countries, this
level is set at, or close to, the lowest drug price in the cluster. In the present analysis, we
follow this practice by assuming that the lowest price in the reference group — i.e., the generic
price — is chosen as the reference price level: p = pG.
3.2.1 Therapeutic reference pricing (TRP)
Under TRP, the reference group consists of all three drugs in the therapeutic market, also
the horizontally diﬀerentiated drug 1. By the assumption of p = pG, the co-payments faced
by patients under TRP are given by
cTRPi =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
pTRPi − (1− α) pTRPG if i = 0, 1
αpTRPG if i = G
. (21)
The co-payments diﬀer as compared to NRP, since the patients that are prescribed one of the
original drugs are now also fully liable for the price diﬀerence with respect to the reference
price.
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As before, explicit expressions for the profit functions under the TRP-system are found
by using (21) in (4)-(7), and the derivation of the equilibrium is similar to that under the
NRP-system. We find equilibrium prices under TRP to be given by
pTRPi = αp
NRP
i , i = 0, 1, G. (22)
Thus, compared with NRP, TRP implies that prices are set as if α = 1. The reason is that,
with TRP, the patients are fully liable for any price increase above the reference level. This
also implies that equilibrium prices are independent of the co-payment rate. Furthermore,
since equilibrium market shares are independent of α, both patient types are equally distorted
under the two regimes.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, relative price diﬀerences and market shares are equal under
NRP and TRP.
Compared with the NRP-case, the (uniform) downward pressure on drug prices under
TRP is also reflected in lower equilibrium profits, now given by
πTRPi = απ
NRP
i , i = 0, 1, G. (23)
3.2.2 Generic reference pricing (GRP)
Under GRP, only generic substitutes are grouped into the same cluster as the original, oﬀ-
patent drugs. Horizontally diﬀerentiated, but therapeutically equivalent drug versions are
not included. In our model, co-payments faced by consumers under GRP are thus given by
cGRPi =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
pGRPi − (1− α) pGRPG if i = 0
αpGRPi if i = 1, G
. (24)
While only a fraction α of the drug price needs to be paid on drugs G and 1, patients that
are prescribed the brand-name drug 0 must additionally pay the full price diﬀerence between
the original drug and the generic substitute.
Equilibrium prices, derived in the same way as previously, are given by
pGRP0 =
¡
2 + α−
√
1− λ (2− λ− α)
¢
Γe∆ , (25)
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pGRP1 =
t∆+ (1− α) (1− θ) γv
³b∆− 2 (2 + α)´−√1− λ (2α− λ (α+ 1))Γ
αe∆ , (26)
pGRPG =
3t
¡
αλ− 3λ+ λ2 + 4
¢
− γv (1− θ) b∆− (4− λ)Γ√1− λe∆ , (27)
where b∆ := 4α+ 5λ− 2αλ− 4λ2 + λ3 + αλ2 + 4 > 0, (28)
e∆ := 8α+ 8λ− 6αλ− 5λ2 + λ3 + 2αλ2 + α2λ > 0, (29)
∆ := 10α+ λ− 6αλ+ 2λ2 − λ3 + αλ2 + 2α2λ > 0, (30)
Γ := 3t− γv (1− θ) (1− α) > 0. (31)
Using the equilibrium prices derived above, we can find the equilibrium market shares
under GRP, characterised by the location of the indiﬀerent patient in each patient-group:
exGRPH = Γ £(2 + α)− (2− λ− α)√1− λ¤
2te∆ , (32)
exGRPL = Γ £α(2− λ) + λ(3− λ) + (2α+ λ)√1− λ¤
2te∆ . (33)
Comparing with (16)-(17), it is also relatively straightforward to verify that
exGRPj > exTRPj = exNRPj , j = H,L, (34)
implying that more patients choose one of the drugs included in the reference cluster under
GRP — drug 0 and G.
In order to evaluate the ranking of equilibrium prices under GRP, we now make a rather
weak assumption on the co-payment rate, namely that α < 23 . We are then able to make the
following characterisation of the pricing equilibrium under generic reference pricing:19
Proposition 3 Assume that α < 23 . Then, under GRP, the brand-name firm without a
generic substitute always charges the highest price in equilibrium. Both patient groups are
generally distorted; the L-types always consume more of the generic drug, while the H-types
19For α ≥ 23 , the ranking of p
GRP
0 and p
GRP
1 is ambigious. It is possible to derive the exact condition, but
the condition is rather messy and also hard to interpret, so we focus on the plausible case of α < 2
3
. The
exact condition can, however, be provided by the authors upon request.
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consume more of the new patent-protected brand-name drug, if λ and/or t are suﬃciently
low, and more of the old oﬀ-patent product otherwise.
A proof is given in the Appendix.
We see that the ranking of equilibrium prices changes under a generic reference price
system. The price is now higher for the brand-name drug without a generic substitute. The
reason is simply that drug 1 is not included in the reference cluster. If a consumer chooses
this drug, her co-payment is given by a share α on the total drug price. In contrast, if she
chooses the oﬀ-patent drug 0, which is included in the reference cluster, she must pay the
full price diﬀerence between the generic substitute and the brand-name drug. Thus, by not
having its product included in the reference group, firm 1 faces a less elastic demand and
will consequently charge a higher price in equilibrium.
In contrast to the NRP or TRP systems, the equilibrium price diﬀerences do not au-
tomatically translate into equivalent diﬀerences in equilibrium market shares. The reason
is the asymmetry introduced by diﬀerent co-payments for patients, depending on whether
or not the demanded drug is subject to reference pricing. Consequently, even if firm 1 sets
the highest drug price, it may not be the most expensive alternative for consumers, and
consequently, this firm may have a higher market share in the H-segment. From Proposition
3, we see that this is the case, if λ and/or t are suﬃciently low. In this case, the price of
the on-patent drug is kept relatively low in order to capture a larger share of the L-segment
(which is more important, the lower the level of λ) and/or due to fierce competition induced
by a relatively low degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation.
On the other hand, the location of the indiﬀerent L-type patient is always distorted
towards drug 1, as before. In other words, due to the price diﬀerence between generic and
brand-name drugs, a larger share of L-patients consume the generic drug G. Finally, it
should be noted that even though the H-segment may be distorted ‘both ways’ under GRP,
the L-segment is always more distorted towards drug 1. This can easily be verified from
(32)-(33) by confirming that exGRPL > exGRPH .
Using the equilibrium prices reported in (25)-(27), we can derive equilibrium profits under
GRP. These profit expressions are rather messy, and are therefore relegated to the Appendix.
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3.3 Price comparison
As a next step, in order to evaluate how the reimbursement system aﬀects drug prices, let
us compare the equilibrium price levels for the same drugs across diﬀerent regimes. Using
the equilibrium prices reported for the diﬀerent cases above, it is relatively straightforward
to verify that
pNRPi > p
GRP
i > p
TRP
i , i = 0, 1, G, (35)
for all t > t. In other words:
Proposition 4 The price of every drug in the therapeutic market is highest under NRP and
lowest under TRP.
This result reflects and confirms the main rationale behind reference pricing. By intro-
ducing a reference pricing system, price competition is generally increased, since the price
elasticity of drug demand increases for prices above the reference price level. Furthermore,
this eﬀect is stronger, if more drugs are included in the reference cluster, implying that drug
prices are lower under TRP than under GRP. Since prices are strategic complements, the
introduction of a reference price system of either kind puts a downward pressure on the prices
of all drugs in the market. Compared with the NRP case, the introduction of generic refer-
ence pricing has a direct negative eﬀect on the price level of drug 0, which in turn leads to a
reduction also in the price of drug 1, even though this drug is not included in the reference
cluster under GRP. Furthermore, by going from GRP to TRP, firm 1 gets a direct incentive
to cut its drug prices, which then indirectly leads to a further price reduction also for drug 0.
Finally, lower prices for brand-name drugs imply that the generic producer must also lower
its price in order to stay in the market.
4 The market entry decision
Let us now turn to the question of market entry. When interpreting the market in question as
a country-specific therapeutic market, demarcated by national regulation, we can realistically
assume that firm 1 will enter this particular market (i.e., oﬀer its newly developed product
in this country) only if expected profits from sales in this market cover the market entry
costs. When considering the costs and benefits of entry, the firm must take into account how
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the reimbursement policy in a given country is likely to aﬀect profits from drug sales in this
country.
In our model, there is a clear-cut ranking of equilibrium profits for the potential entrant
(firm 1) across the diﬀerent reimbursement regimes:
Proposition 5 Equilibrium profits of the patent-holding entrant are always highest under
NRP and lowest under TRP.
A proof is given in the Appendix.
The profit comparison between NRP and TRP is straightforward. Compared with the
case of no reference pricing, the TRP system puts a downward pressure on drug prices, while
keeping equilibrium market shares intact, implying that profits are unambiguously lower
in the TRP equilibrium. NRP also outperforms GRP, from the viewpoint of firm 1, since
prices and market shares are higher in the former case. A comparison between GRP and
TRP, on the other hand, shows that in the former case prices are higher, but market shares
lower. Nevertheless, equilibrium profits are always higher under generic reference pricing.
The reason is that under GRP, firm 1 faces drug demand with a lower price elasticity, which
enables this firm to charge a considerably higher price while suﬀering a moderate loss of
market shares. All else equal, it follows that expected profits for a potential entrant are
always lowest when entering a market that is subject to therapeutic reference pricing, and
highest when entering a market with no reference pricing.
This result is not surprising and tallies well with popular concern about therapeutic
reference pricing with respect to a potential erosion of patent rights, as discussed in the In-
troduction. However, it is worth noting that a patent-holding firm can be negatively aﬀected
by reference pricing even if on-patent drugs are exempted from this particular reimburse-
ment system. In our model, firm 1’s profits are lower under GRP, compared with no reference
pricing, even though drug 1 is not included in the reference cluster. The reason is that firm
1 oﬀers a drug that is an imperfect substitute to the drugs directly aﬀected by the GRP
system. Stronger price competition between firms 0 and G — induced by generic reference
pricing — implies that firm 1 is also forced to lower the price of its on-patent drug in order
to reduce the loss of market shares.
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5 Welfare considerations
In this section we discuss how considerations for social welfare will influence the optimal
choice of reimbursement scheme for pharmaceuticals. We naturally assume that a regulator
has two main concerns: (i) aggregate mismatch costs and (ii) total drug expenditures. The
former is a measure of total health risks to patients from drug consumption, which a benev-
olent regulator obviously wants to minimise. We assume that the regulator also wants to
minimise total expenditures for drug consumption, but the weighting of these two objectives
— in case of conflict — might depend on the characteristics of the country in question.
We can distinguish between two polar cases. In countries with a significant pharmaceu-
tical industry, it is reasonable to assume that profits of pharmaceutical firms matter for the
national regulator. In this case, the welfare costs of higher drug prices might be restricted
to the eﬃciency costs of increased third-party funding for drug expenditures.20 Naturally,
a regulator will put relatively more emphasis on minimising aggregate mismatch costs from
drug consumption in this case.21 On the other hand, in countries with no pharmaceutical
industry, it is reasonable to assume that drug expenditures are more important in terms of
national welfare. Indeed, a stated desire behind the introduction of reference pricing in many
countries is precisely to curb total outlays on pharmaceutical consumption.
In the subsequent analysis, we start out by examining the eﬀect of diﬀerent RP-systems on
aggregate mismatch costs. Then, in the latter part of this section, we proceed to discuss the
optimal choice of reimbursement system in the presence of three partly conflicting regulatory
goals: minimising mismatch costs, keeping drug prices low, and stimulating market entry.22
5.1 Mismatch costs
Total mismatch costs under reimbursement system k, denoted by Ck, are given by
Ck = λ
ÃZ hxkH
0
(st) ds+
Z 1
hxkH
((1− s) t) ds
!
+ (1− λ)
ÃZ hxkL
0
(st) ds+
Z 1
hxkL
((1− s) t) ds
!
.
(36)
20 In a model with unit demand, patient copayment for drugs is an eﬃcient transfer from consumers to
producers with no eﬃciency costs associated.
21This will also be the case if we take the perspective of global welfare.
22 In our discussion of welfare and policy implications, we implicitly make the assumption that a regulator
does not take into account the ‘artificial’ vertical diﬀerentiation between the branded and generic drugs, and
attaches the same gross utility to objectively homogenous products. We think this is a reasonable (though
not trivial) assumption.
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Clearly, total mismatch costs are minimised if exkL = exkH = 12 . In other words, mismatch
costs are minimised if all patients located at x ≤ 12 are prescribed either drug 0 or G, while
all patients located at x > 12 are prescribed drug 1. However, due to price diﬀerences, total
mismatch costs will never be minimised in equilibrium. We have previously shown that
exkj 6= 12 for at least one patient type in all three reimbursement regimes. We also know that
equilibrium market shares are equal under NRP and TRP, implying that total mismatch
costs must also be equal under these two regimes.
The explicit expression for total mismatch costs in each of the three diﬀerent regimes,
which are quite messy, are given in the Appendix. Based on these expressions, we are
able to derive the following unambiguous ranking of reimbursement systems with respect to
equilibrium mismatch costs:
CGRP > CTRP = CNRP . (37)
In other words:23
Proposition 6 NRP and TRP yield equal mismatch costs in equilibrium, and these are
always lower than under GRP.
In order to explain this result, let us first consider the distortive eﬀects of GRP on each
of the two patient types. We know that exGRPL > exTRPL = exNRPL > 12 , due to the larger price
diﬀerence between the generic drug and the horizontally (and vertically) diﬀerentiated drug 1
under GRP. This implies that GRP always increases total mismatch costs in the L-segment.
For H-types, on the other hand, we know that exTRPH = exNRPH < 12 and exGRPH > exTRPH =exNRPH . However, since exGRPH ≶ 12 , it is possible that GRP reduces aggregate mismatch
costs for the H-types, if exGRPH is suﬃciently close to the midpoint of the line segment S.
Nevertheless, a possible reduction in mismatch costs for H-types will always be more than
outweighed by the increase in mismatch costs for L-types. The reason is twofold. First,
mismatch costs are reduced for H-types only if λ — the fraction of H-types in the population
— is suﬃciently low (cf. Proposition 3), in which case the contribution of H-types to total
mismatch costs is also relatively low. Second, since the location of the indiﬀerent L-type is
23The proof, though conceptually straightforward, involves some extremely tedious and messy algebra and
is thus not reported. However, just to give a brief sketch, it is possible to show that CGRP − CNRP = ϕ1ϕ2 ,
where ϕ2 > 0 and ϕ1 is a convex quadratic function of t which crosses zero from below at t = t. Thus, ϕ1 > 0
for t > t. It follows that CGRP > CTRP = CNRP for t > t.
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further away from the midpoint of S in all regimes, the eﬀect of a marginal relocation of the
indiﬀerent patient on total mismatch costs is — all else equal — larger in the L-segment.
The result stated in Proposition 6 is perhaps somewhat surprising. It certainly runs
contrary to the popular concern about the discriminatory eﬀects of therapeutic reference
pricing, that this reimbursement system forces a larger number of patients to opt for a less
suitable drug — thereby increasing mismatch costs — simply to avoid the extra co-payment.
However, this is not the case in our model. True, therapeutic reference pricing will increase
overall mismatch costs for given prices, if we use the NRP-case as a benchmark. But this
argument ignores the fact that pharmaceutical firms will adjust their pricing policies accord-
ing to the drug reimbursement system. In our specific model, we have seen that TRP will
lead to a proportionally equal reduction in all drug prices, leaving patients’ drug choices
unaﬀected in equilibrium compared to NRP. Generic reference pricing, on the other hand,
will lead to more distorted drug choices, due to larger equilibrium price diﬀerences within
the therapeutic market. Since the on-patent drug is exempted from reference pricing under
GRP, firm 1 faces a less price-elastic demand than its competitors and can thus charge a
considerably higher price in equilibrium. This, in turn, induces more patients to choose the
drugs that are included in the reference cluster, leading to higher overall mismatch costs.
5.2 Policy implications
If a regulator seeks to minimise overall mismatch costs, the above analysis suggests that
generic reference pricing should never be implemented. Mismatch costs are minimised by
choosing either NRP or TRP.
However, there are potentially two other considerations that might be taken into account.
First, the price level of pharmaceutical drugs will play a role, if the regulator is concerned
about curbing total outlays on pharmaceuticals. As previously discussed, the relative weight-
ing of mismatch costs and prices in the welfare function is likely to depend on the relative
importance of the pharmaceutical industry in the country in question. The more important
the pharmaceutical industry is, the less concerned a regulator should be about pharmaceu-
tical prices. In any case, as long as the regulator places any weight on pharmaceutical prices
at all, the above analysis clearly suggests that a therapeutic reference price system should
be implemented, as this reimbursement scheme minimises both mismatch costs and prices.
21
However, this conclusion is only valid if there is indeed an additional, horizontally dif-
ferentiated, drug version that can be included in the therapeutic cluster. Since equilibrium
profits are lowest under TRP (cf. Proposition 5), this reimbursement system makes market
entry least likely for a given level of market entry costs. If the possibility of no market
entry is taken into account, then the welfare considerations are no longer clearly in favour
of TRP. First, no entry will lead to maximal mismatch costs, because only one treatment
version (drug 0 and its generic substitute) is oﬀered in the market. Second, the absence of
competition from a horizontally diﬀerentiated drug will lead to increased drug prices under
both NRP and GRP. In this scenario, the regulator must take into account how the choice
of reimbursement system is likely to aﬀect the probability of market entry for new drugs.
No clear-cut conclusions can be made about the optimal choice of reimbursement system.
However, based on the above analysis, we can make the following classification of scenaria.
Therapeutic reference pricing — which minimises both mismatch costs and drug prices — is
clearly the socially favourable reimbursement system, if market entry costs are low with a
corresponding low risk of no market entry for new drugs. However, if this is not the case,
then either NRP or GRP might be necessary to stimulate market entry. There is then a
case for no reference pricing — which minimises mismatch costs but maximises drug prices
— in countries where drug prices do not play an important role for social welfare due to
a dominant pharmaceutical industry. On the other hand, generic reference pricing might
be the favoured reimbursement system in countries where the pharmaceutical industry is
insignificant or non-existent, since GRP leads to lower drug prices than NRP.
6 Concluding remarks
We have analysed the eﬀects of reference pricing systems for pharmaceuticals, focusing on
a specific therapeutic market with potentially three pharmaceutical firms. Two of the firms
oﬀer horizontally diﬀerentiated brand-name drugs. One of these drugs is oﬀ-patent and faces
competition from a generic version oﬀered by a third firm. The other drug is on-patent, and
will be introduced in the market, if the profits are suﬃcient to cover the entry costs.
This framework has allowed us to compare generic reference pricing (GRP) and thera-
peutic reference pricing (TRP), as well as the benchmark-case of no reference pricing (NRP).
We have shown that TRP triggers competition most, resulting in lower equilibrium prices for
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every drug in the therapeutic market. We have also shown that GRP distorts drug choices
most, resulting in a higher level of patient health risks — measured in terms of aggregate
mismatch costs — than the other two reimbursement systems. Thus, TRP is preferable from
the perspective of both the purchaser (payer) and the patients.
Notably, the beneficial role of TRP crucially relies on the assumption that the new on-
patent drug enters the market. If the market entry costs are suﬃciently high, TRP may in
fact result in a worse outcome than both GRP and NRP, as described above. It has, however,
been argued that TRP may induce pharmaceutical firms to invest more in drastic innovations,
which are not subject to reference pricing, rather than ‘me-too’ innovations, which very likely
will be included in a reference group. The trade-oﬀ with respect to therapeutically similar
me-too innovations is thus the following: while me-too innovations increase competition and
reduce patients’ mismatch costs by oﬀering a diﬀerent variant of treatment for the same
illness, they might crowd out drastic innovations if they reduce the budget available for
R&D. On the other hand, diﬀerent drug versions are often innovated in so-called R&D-
races, implying that me-too innovations are already in the ‘pipeline’ of innovations when
the first drastic innovation enters the market. A thorough analysis of this issue requires an
explicit model of drug innovations, which is outside the scope of the present paper. Thus,
we leave this issue for further research.
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A Derivation of the price equilibrium
In a vertically separating equilibrium, characterised by a price vector (p0, p1, pG), the follow-
ing conditions must hold:
Condition 1: pG ≥ 0.
Condition 2: UL (x,G) ≥ UL (x, 0) .
Condition 3: UH (x, 0) ≥ UH (x,G) .
Condition 4: UH (exH , 0) ≥ 0.
Condition 5: UL (exL, G) ≥ 0.
Condition 6: π0 (p0, p1, pG) ≥ π0 (bp0, p1, pG) , where bp0 solves UL (x,G) = UL (x, 0) .
Condition 7: πG (p0, p1, pG) ≥ πG (p0, p1, bpG) , where bpG solves UH (x, 0) = UH (x,G) .
The first condition simply states that the generic price must be non-negative. Conditions
2-3 ensure that the equilibrium really separates, i.e., that H-types choose the brand-name
drug 0, while L-types choose the generic substitute. Conditions 4 and 5 secure full market
coverage, requiring that the indiﬀerent patients obtain non-negative utility from purchasing
and consuming either of the drugs. Finally, Condition 6 (7) ensures that Firm 0 (Firm G)
has no incentive to deviate by reducing its price and serve the L-types (H-types).
In the following, we will derive the price equilibrium in detail for the NRP-case. For the
two other cases — where the derivation of the equilibrium follows an identical procedure — we
will just present the constraints that support the equilibrium.
A.1 No reference pricing (NRP)
Profit functions are given by (7), with ci = αpi. Let us first confirm that unconstrained
pricing by all three firms cannot constitute an equilibrium. Unconstrained maximisation of
the firms’ profit functions yields the following reaction functions:
p0 =
1
2α
(t+ αp1) , (A1)
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p1 =
1
2α
[t+ (1− λ) (1− θ) γv + αpG (1− λ) + αλp0] , (A2)
pG =
1
2α
[t+ αp1 − γv (1− θ)] , (A3)
which yield the following candidate equilibrium prices:
p0 =
1
α
∙
t+
1
6
γv (1− θ) (1− λ)
¸
, (A4)
p1 =
1
α
∙
t+
1
3
γv (1− θ) (1− λ)
¸
, (A5)
pG =
1
α
∙
t− 1
6
γv (1− θ) (2 + λ)
¸
. (A6)
We can show that this price vector always violates Condition 2. In the NRP-case, Condition
2 can be expressed as
pG ≤ p0 −
1
α
γv (1− θ) . (A7)
Using (A4) and (A6), this condition reduces to 1 ≥ 2, which is a contradiction. In other
words, (A4)-(A6) cannot be an equilibrium, because pG is too high to induce even the L-type
patients to buy the generic drug. Consequently, we must look for an equilibrium where the
generic drug is priced suﬃciently low, so that not only the L-types are not induced to switch
to drug 0, but firm 0 must also have no incentive to capture the L-types by lowering its price
from the equilibrium level.
Using (A1)-(A2), we can express the profit of firm 0 as a function of pG:
π0 (pG) =
λ [3t+ (1− λ) (αpG + (1− θ)γv)]2
2αt (4− λ)2
. (A8)
Firm 0 can drive the generic competitor out of the market, and capture equal shares of the
H- and L-types, by setting a price
bp0 = pG + 1αγv (1− θ) , (A9)
which yields a ‘deviation’ profit given by
bπ0 (pG) = [6t− (2 + λ) (αpG + (1− θ)γv)] (αpG + (1− θ)γv)
2αt (4− λ) . (A10)
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The optimal strategy for firm G is thus to set a price pG that is just low enough to make
such a deviation unprofitable. This price is given by the solution to
π0 (pG) = bπ0 (pG) . (A11)
We can thus derive the price equilibrium by solving the three equations (A1), (A2) and
(A11). The solution is presented as (9)-(11) in Section 3.
It remains to specify Conditions 1-7 for the NRP-case. By construction of the equilibrium,
we know that Condition 6 is automatically satisfied. We can also show that Condition 2 is
always satisfied. In the NRP-case, this condition is given by
θγv − αpNRPG ≥ γv − αpNRP0 , (A12)
which, using (9) and (11), reduces to
∆0 −∆G ≥ 0, (A13)
which is true for all λ ∈ (0, 1). The remainder of the constraints can be expressed in the
form of 4 diﬀerent conditions on t. From (11), we see that a non-negative generic drug price
— Condition 1 — is guaranteed if
t ≥ tNRP1 :=
(1− θ) γv
3∆G
. (A14)
Furthermore, non-negative utility for the indiﬀerent consumers of the H- and L-type, re-
spectively, is guaranteed if
t ≤ tNRP4 :=
2v
1 + 3∆0 +∆1
(A15)
and
t ≤ tNRP5 :=
2γv
1 +∆1 + 3∆G
. (A16)
The necessary Condition 7 is not analytically solvable. However, to simplify, we can find a
suﬃcient condition on t that satisfies Conditions 3 and 7 simultaneously. By assuming that
H-types always prefer drug 0 over drug G for the equilibrium price pNRP0 and a zero-priced
generic drug (i.e., pG = 0), it must be true that H-types always prefer drug 0 in equilibrium
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(for a non-negative generic drug price) and that price-undercutting by the generic firm in
order to capture H-type consumers is not an option. Using pNRP0 from (9), and setting
pG = 0, this condition is given by
t ≤ tNRP7 :=
v (1− θ)
3∆0
. (A17)
To sum up, a price equilibrium exists in the NRP-case, and is given by (9)-(11), when
t ∈
h
t, tNRP
i
, where t := tNRP1 and t
NRP
:= min
©
tNRP4 , t
NRP
5 , t
NRP
7
ª
. In general, existence
of the equilibrium requires that the share of L-types is relatively low, combined with a
suﬃciently large diﬀerence in gross valuations between the two types. To give an illustrative
numerical example, assume that v = 1, λ = 0.9, θ = 0.8 and γ = 0.4. In this case, t = 0.12
and tNRP = tNRP7 = 0.20. Note also that the equilibrium exists for an even wider range of
mismatch costs, since the upper bound tNRP in this case is a suﬃcient, but not necessary
condition.
A.2 Therapeutic reference pricing (TRP)
The price equilibrium under TRP is derived similarly to the NRP-case and given by (22) in
Section 3. As before, Condition 6 is automatically satisfied. Furthermore, Conditions 1 and
2 are identical under NRP and TRP. The remainder of the Conditions — 4, 5 and 3+7 — are
given by, respectively,
t ≤ tTRP4 :=
2 (1− γ (1− θ) (1− α)) v
1 + 3∆0 +∆1 − 6∆G (1− α)
, (A18)
t ≤ tTRP5 :=
2 (θ + α (1− θ)) γv
1 +∆1 − 3∆G (1− 2α)
, (A19)
t ≤ tTRP7 :=
(1− γ (1− α)) (1− θ) v
3 (∆0 −∆G (1− α))
. (A20)
Thus, under TRP, an equilibrium exists, and is given by (22), when t ∈
h
t, tTRP
i
, where
tTRP := min
©
tTRP4 , t
TRP
5 , t
TRP
7
ª
. It is worth noting that, due to lower equilibrium prices,
the range of mismatch costs for which the equilibrium exists is generally wider under TRP.
Using the same numerical example as in the NRP-case, with a 10 per cent co-payment rate
(α = 0.1), the lower and upper bounds on t are given by t = 0.12 and tTRP = tTRP7 = 0.34.
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A.3 Generic reference pricing (GRP)
The price equilibrium under GRP is derived similarly to the NRP- and TRP-cases, and given
by (25)-(27) in Section 3. As before, Condition 6 is automatically satisfied.
Using (25)-(27), we can derive the remainder of the conditions that support the equilib-
rium under GRP. Once more, it can be shown that Condition 1 is satisfied if t ≥ t, implying
that Condition 1 is identical for all three regimes.
Condition 2 is given by
t ≥ tGRP2 :=
1
3
(1− α) (1− θ) γv. (A21)
Since tGRP1 ≥ (1− θ) γv, it follows that t ≥ tGRP2 . Thus, as long as Condition 1 is satisfied,
Condition 2 is also automatically satisfied. Conditions 4 and 5 are given by, respectively,
t ≤ tGRP4 :=
2e∆v + (1− α) (1− θ) γv ³3 (2 + α) + κ − 2b∆´e∆+∆+ 15α− 3λα (4− α− λ)− 3 (1− λ) (2− λ) + 3κ , (A22)
where
κ :=
√
1− λ [2 + λ− α (5− 2λ)] ,
and
t ≤ tGRP5 := γv
e∆ (1 + θ) + (1− θ) h(1− α) [2 (2 + α) + ς]− b∆ (1− 2α)ie∆+∆+ 3α [4− λ (3− α− λ)] + 3ς , (A23)
where
ς :=
√
1− λ (λ (2α+ 1)− 6α) .
Finally, the suﬃcient condition that simultaneously satisfies Condition 3 and Condition 7 is
given by
t ≤ tGRP7 :=
(1− θ)
³e∆v + γv (1− α)³2 + α+√1− λ (2− α (3− λ))− b∆´´
3
¡
5α+ λ (1− α) (3− α− λ) +
√
1− λ (2− α (3− λ))− 2
¢ . (A24)
Thus, under GRP, an equilibrium exists and is given by (25)-(27), when t ∈
h
t, tGRP
i
,
where tGRP := min
©
tGRP4 , t
GRP
5 , t
GRP
7
ª
. Once more, due to the general price reducing eﬀect
of reference pricing, the range of mismatch costs for which the equilibrium exists is generally
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wider under the GRP system compared to the NRP case. Using the same numerical example
as previously, the lower and upper bounds on t are given by t = 0.12 and tGRP = tGRP7 = 0.29.
B Equilibrium profits under GRP
Equilibrium profits under generic reference pricing are given by
πGRP0 =
¡
2 + α−
√
1− λ (2− λ− α)
¢2
Γ2λ
2te∆2 , (B1)
πGRP1 =
(3t− Γ)
¡
Ω− 2
√
1− λ (λ− 2α+ αλ)Ψ
¢
+ t2
¡
6
√
1− λ (λ− 2α+ αλ)∆+Φ
¢
2tαe∆2 ,
(B2)
πGRPG =
Γ
¡
α (2− λ) + λ (3− λ) +
√
1− λ (2α+ λ)
¢
(1− λ)Θ
2te∆2 , (B3)
where
Ω := 2tω1 + γv (1− α) (1− θ)ω2,
ω1 : = 64αλ+ 8α
2 + 2λ2 + 9λ3 − 12λ4 + 6λ5 − λ6
−86αλ2 − 8α2λ+ 40αλ3 + 4α3λ− 6αλ4 + 19α2λ2
−13α2λ3 − 4α3λ2 + 3α2λ4 + 2α3λ3,
ω2 : = 16αλ+ 8α2 + 26λ2 − 41λ3 + 26λ4 − 8λ5 + λ6 − 30αλ2 − 16α2λ
+28αλ3 − 12αλ4 + 2αλ5 + 13α2λ2 − 5α2λ3 + α2λ4,
Ψ : = γv (1− α) (1− θ)
¡
2α+ 5λ− 2αλ− 4λ2 + λ3 + αλ2
¢
+2t
¡
2α− 7λ+ 7λ2 − 2λ3 − αλ2 + α2λ
¢
,
Φ : = 136α2 − 16αλ+ 10λ2 − 5λ3 + 2λ4 − 4λ5 + λ6 + 82αλ2
−192α2λ− 60αλ3 + 40α3λ+ 16αλ4 − 2αλ5 + 105α2λ2
−13α2λ3 − 24α3λ2 − 3α2λ4 + 4α3λ3 + 4α4λ2,
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Θ := 3t
¡
αλ− 3λ+ λ2 + 4
¢
− γv (1− θ) b∆−√1− λ (4− λ)Γ.
C Equilibrium mismatch costs
Inserting the expressions for the locations of indiﬀerent patients in the diﬀerent reimburse-
ment regimes — reported throughout Section 3 — into (36), equilibrium mismatch costs are
given by
CNRP = CTRP =
³
δ − 6
√
1− λ (5λ+ 4) (1− λ)3
´
t
4
¡
3λ− 3λ2 + λ3 + 8
¢2 , (C1)
where
δ := 104 + 6λ− 78λ2 + 53λ3 − 15λ4 + 15λ5 − 4λ6,
and
CGRP =
(3t− Γ)
£
(3t− Γ)
¡
2
√
1− λΥ− Λ
¢
+ 2t
¡√
1− λµ− η
¢¤
+ t2
¡
z+ 6ξ
√
1− λ
¢
4te∆2 ,
(C2)
where
ξ : = 16αλ− 12λ− 4α2 + 23λ2 − 17λ3 + 4λ4 − 18αλ2 + 5α2λ
+4αλ3 − 2α3λ+ αλ4 − 3α2λ2 + 2α2λ3 + α3λ2,
z : = 72λ+ 64αλ+ 104α2 − 94λ2 + 74λ3 − 53λ4 + 25λ5 − 4λ6
−150α2λ− 30αλ3 + 20α3λ+ 44αλ4 − 10αλ5 + 66α2λ2
+7α2λ3 − 12α3λ2 − 6α2λ4 + 2α3λ3 + 2α4λ2 − 40αλ2,
Λ : = 12λ3 − 16αλ− 8α2 − 2λ2 − 8λ− 7λ4 + λ5 + 24αλ2
+14α2λ− 14αλ3 + 2αλ4 − 8α2λ2 + α2λ3,
Υ := 8αλ− 4λ+ 4α2 + 5λ2 − 4λ3 + λ4 − 10αλ2 − 5α2λ+ 3αλ3 + 2α2λ2,
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µ : = 24λ− 40αλ− 8α2 − 38λ2 + 29λ3 − 7λ4 + 48αλ2 + 10α2λ
−13αλ3 + 2α3λ− αλ4 − 3α2λ2 − 2α2λ3 − α3λ2,
η : = 24λ− 8αλ+ 8α2 − 34λ2 + 21λ3 − 12λ4 + 6λ5 − λ6
+16αλ2 − 14α2λ− 20αλ3 − 2α3λ+ 15αλ4 − 3αλ5
−5α2λ2 + 11α2λ3 + 2α3λ2 − 3α2λ4 − α3λ3.
D Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3
In equilibrium, the price diﬀerence between the two brand-name drugs is given by
pGRP1 − pGRP0 =
γv (1− α) (1− θ)
hb∆− 4 + α2 −√1− λ ¡λ− α2¢i+ tσ
αe∆ , (D1)
where
σ := 4α+ λ− 6αλ− 3α2 + 2λ2 − λ3 + αλ2 + 2α2λ+ 3
√
1− λ
¡
λ− α2
¢
.
By the definition of b∆, it can easily be verified that the sum of the four terms in the square
brackets in the numerator in (D1) is positive for α ∈ (0, 1) and λ ∈ (0, 1). The sign of the
expression depends thus on the sign of σ. Once more, it is relatively straightforward to verify
that σ > 0 for all λ ∈ (0, 1) if α < 23 . Thus, α <
2
3 is a suﬃcient condition for p
GRP
1 > p
GRP
0 .
Regarding equilibrium market allocations, we derive from (33) that
exGRPL > 12 if t > γv (1− θ)β,
where
β := (1− α)
√
1− λ (2α+ λ) + 2α+ λ (3− λ− α)
3
√
1− λ (2α+ λ)− 2α+ λ+ 3αλ+ 2λ2 − λ3 − 2αλ2 − α2λ
.
It is fairly straightforward to verify that β < 1 for α ∈ (0, 1) and λ ∈ (0, 1). This implies that
t > γv (1− θ)β (and thus exGRPL > 12) as long as Condition 1 (non-negative generic price) is
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satisfied.
Now consider the indiﬀerent type-H patient. From (32) we can characterise exGRPH as a
function of t in the following way:
∂exGRPH
∂t
> 0 for t 6= 0,
lim
t→0+
¡exGRPH ¢→ −∞,
and
lim
t→−∞
¡exGRPH ¢ = limt→∞ ¡exGRPH ¢ = ϑ,
where
ϑ :=
3
¡
2 + α−
√
1− λ (2− λ− α)
¢
2e∆ .
It follows that exGRPH < 12 for t > 0 if ϑ < 12 for α ∈ (0, 1) and λ ∈ (0, 1). On the other hand,
if ϑ > 12 for some combinations of λ and α, it must be that exGRPH > 12 if t is suﬃciently
high. Solving ϑ = 12 for α yields a function α
∗ (λ), such that ϑ < (>) 12 if α < (>)α
∗ (λ). It
is straightforward to verify that ∂α∗/∂λ > 0 and that α∗ < 0 for λ < 0.54. It follows that
exGRPH < 12 if λ < 0.54, whereas, for λ > 0.54, exGRPH > 12 if λ and/or t are suﬃciently high.
By numerical simulations, it is also straightforward to verify that both cases, exGRPH < 12 andexGRPH > 12 , can occur in equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
A direct analytical comparison of equilibrium profits for firm 1 under the three diﬀerent
regimes is infeasible, since the equilibrium profit expression under GRP is extremely messy.
However, we can prove the proposition via a somewhat more subtle route, by considering how
diﬀerent reimbursement systems aﬀect equilibrium prices and market shares. From Propo-
sition 3 we know that there is a clear-cut ranking of equilibrium prices across the diﬀerent
regimes, where pNRPi > p
GRP
i > p
TRP
i , i = 0, 1, G. Regarding equilibrium market shares,
we know that these are identical under NRP and TRP. Furthermore, we also know that
exGRPj > exTRPj = exNRPj , j = H,L. Thus, since pNRP1 > pGRP1 > pTRP1 and demand is at least
as high under NRP than under any other reimbursement regime, it follows unambiguously
that πNRP1 > max
©
πGRP1 , π
TRP
1
ª
. Regarding the comparison between GRP and TRP, it is
not immediately obvious that firm 1 earns higher profits under GRP, since prices are higher,
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but market shares are lower, compared with TRP. Note, however, that equilibrium prices
are higher for all firms under GRP, compared with TRP. Furthermore, we know that, for
given prices, cGRP1 < c
TRP
1 . Thus, if firm 1 unilaterally deviates from the GRP equilibrium
by setting a price equal to the equilibrium price under TRP, this firm will increase its market
shares, in both consumer segments, beyond its equilibrium market shares under TRP, and
consequently earn higher profits than under TRP. Such a deviation is not profitable, so firm
1 must earn even higher profits in the GRP equilibrium, where pGRP1 > p
TRP
1 . Q.E.D.
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